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ABSTRACT
While the United States Supreme Court held in Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin that the University’s admissions plan was constitutional and
that race-conscious admissions policies are still permissible, the movement
to eliminate the consideration of race in college and university admissions is
still going strong in current litigation against the University of North Carolina
– Chapel Hill and Harvard University. Many argue that we are living in a
“post-racial” society and no longer need race-conscious admissions; however, this Article argues through colorblind discourse that there has been a
sustained and continual effort to eliminate the consideration of race. This Article provides an understanding of colorblind discourse, the legal background
on race-conscious admissions, it applies colorblind discourse while examining current litigation, and it proposes best-practices for recruiting and retaining diversity on college campuses.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On December 9, 2015, during the 2015 – 2016 term, the United States
Supreme Court (the “Supreme Court”) heard for a second time, Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin (Fisher I and Fisher II). The main question
centered on whether the University of Texas at Austin’s (“UTA”) implementation of its admissions plan in conjunction with Texas’s Top Ten Percent
Plan met the two-prong strict scrutiny standard of being a compelling state
interest and narrowly tailored means to meet the stated objective.1 In its 2013
Fisher I ruling, the Supreme Court found the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
(“Fifth Circuit”) failed to properly apply the strict scrutiny analysis to the

1. Fisher v. Univ. Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
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contested plan.2 In 2011 and 2014, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the University’s admissions format is constitutionally sound based on the strict scrutiny
standard.3 Because the application of the doctrinal framework for strict scrutiny is at issue between the high court and the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme
Court’s analysis in Fisher II is of great interest, along with the various contests against race-conscious admissions.
This Article uses colorblind discourse to analyze post-racialism arguments in today’s legal contests against race-conscious admissions in current
litigation against Harvard University and the University of North Carolina –
Chapel Hill and efforts at the state level to ban affirmative action. This Article will first define the concept of post-racialism and present arguments that
opponents of race-conscious admissions believe racism is no longer embedded in our education systems. This Article then examines colorblind discourse and its intersection with education. Some legal scholars have argued
that the Supreme Court has adopted a colorblind constitutionalism,4 which is
“a collection of legal themes functioning as a racial ideology”5 that operates
as “treating race as if it were, like eye color, a wholly irrelevant characteristic.”6 Colorblindness is maintained and perpetuated by the denial of race as
a social and cultural definer.7 If race is reduced to one’s imagination or a farfetched rationale for claims of inequity, candid discussions about race are
ignored or relegated to “nonsense.” Intentionally and inadvertently, the
colorblind legal rhetoric has and continues to be used to enfranchise while
simultaneously disenfranchising people of color.8
Second, this Article will provide a background of race-conscious admissions cases, such as Bakke,9 Grutter,10 Gratz,11 and Fisher I,12 before using
the understanding of colorblind discourse to posit why the Supreme Court

2. Fisher v. Univ. Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
3. Fisher v. Univ. Tex. at Austin, No. 09-50822 (5th Cir. January 18, 2011; 5th Cir. July 15,
2014), available at: http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/09/09-50822-CV2.pdf.
4. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 68 (1991);
see also Girardeau A. Spann, Whatever, 65 VAND. L. REV. 203, 209 (2012); see also David A.
Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, SUP. CT. REV. 99, 134 (1986); see also Laurence H. Tribe, In
What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law Be Colorblind?, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 201, 207
(1986).
5. Gotanda, supra note 4, at 2.
6. Strauss, supra note 4, at 114.
7. Id.
8. David G. Holmes, Affirmative Reaction: Kennedy, Nixon, King and the Evolution of ColorBlind Rhetoric, 26 RHETORIC REV. 24, 26 (2007).
9. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
10. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
11. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
12. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2411.
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accepted Fisher I for a second time, especially in light of justiciability questions regarding the “troublesome threshold issues relating to standing and
mootness.”13 In this portion, the Article will also analyze the Supreme
Court’s Fisher II oral arguments and ruling. Third, current litigation and efforts to ban race-conscious admissions, such as Students for Fair Admissions
v. Harvard University14 and Students for Fair Admissions v. University of
North Carolina-Chapel Hill,15 are discussed. And finally, this Article discusses implications and best practices for institutions to continue recruiting,
admitting, and enrolling students of color. Given that the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Fisher II continues to uphold race-conscious admissions and there
are two other lawsuits in litigation, this Article revisits the Supreme Court’s
race-conscious admission decisions as a precursor to examining challenges
involving race-conscious admissions again if the matter reaches the Supreme
Court with a President Trump appointed justice.
II. POST-RACIALISM
Following the first election of President Barack Obama, individuals with
various political ideologies touted that America was now a “post-racial” society.16 This mythical assertion permeated not only everyday discourse, but
it also became a useful legal tool in race-conscious admissions debates. Specifically in a legal context, “[r]ace-based affirmative action, race-based admissions or redistricting in school-desegregation plans . . . all come under
scrutiny in a post racial-world.”17
Given the vacancy on the Supreme Court as a result of Justice Scalia’s
sudden death in 2016, his successor, President Trump’s nominated Neil Gorsuch, most likely will be an advocate of post-racial measures, which will
cloak the continued advancement of White supremacy. “In short, post-racialism insulates white normativity from criticism and opens the floodgates
of white resentment when confronted with previously accepted and unquestioned civil rights inequities.”18 A post-racial society rebuts history and context in lieu of the belief that equal opportunity is afforded to all Americans
without any discriminatory barriers. Coupled with colorblind discourse,
post-racial society rhetoric impedes persuasive legal arguments.
13. Spann, supra note 4, at 204.
14. Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard Univ., No. 1:14-cv-14176 (D. Mass. filed Nov.
17, 2014).
15. Students for Fair Admissions v. Univ. of N.C.-Chapel Hill, No. 1:14-CV-00954-LCBJLW (M.D.N.C. filed Nov. 17, 2014).
16. Michael C. Dawson & Lawrence D. Bobo, One Year Later and the Myth of a Post-Racial
Society, DU BOIS REV. 6:2, 247, 247-49 (2009).
17. Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1649 (2009).
18. Cho, supra note 17, at 1596.
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III. COLORBLIND DISCOURSE
Colorblind discourse centers “on managing the appearance of formal
equality without worrying overmuch about the consequences of real-world
inequality. Proponents of a colorblind ethos define freedom and equality exclusively in terms of the autonomous—some would say atomized—individual.”19 This “atomized-individual” is without a history and void of political
affiliations or social interactions.20 This person exists in an abstract world
with equal opportunity and preferences, rather than a racist, sexist, homophobic and socially stratified structure.21 Ultimately, the atomized person is a
fictitious creation of non-Whites that masks White supremacy and frustrates
the realities of people of color as they seek higher education admission.22
Colorblind discourse is used to examine these cases from a critical perspective to understand the judicial approach in race-conscious admissions.
This colorblind universe that has embedded itself into our society is substantiated by social and legal systems. First, race and skin tone are viewed
as synonymous.23 The reduction of race to pigmentation allows people to
argue that categorizing by perceived phenotype is discriminatory.24 However, the historical, but silenced, racial stratification saturated with privileges
for Whites, is absent.25 Second, acknowledging race as a scientifically
flawed project by depraved-hearted White men versus a powerful and dominating societal construction, frames race as taboo to recognize and those who
do are “implicitly manifesting racial enmity or racial preference.”26 Third,
presenting racism as a “personal problem” and offending behavior only being
exhibited by Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”) members, erroneously leaves out liberal
card-carrying Whites.27 This erroneous disconnection of racism from subtle
everyday acts masks power and subordination.
Absent from the Supreme Court Justices’ questions regarding allegations
of reverse discrimination by White plaintiffs is the acknowledgement and
validation of the systematic, cyclical, and long-standing underrepresentation
of students of color in university settings due to racism, specifically at selective institutions, such as Michigan, Texas, North Carolina-Chapel Hill, and
19. Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, The Ideology of Colorblindness, in RETHINKING THE
COLOR LINE: READINGS IN RACE AND ETHNICITY 101, 105 (Charles A. Gallagher ed., 5th ed.,
2014).
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Guinier & Torres, supra note 19, at 101.
24. See id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 102.
27. Id.
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Harvard. Studies show students of color are more likely to attend resourcepoor schools, tracked away from academic programs that lead to college, and
placed in vocational programs.28 If the K-12 pipeline is stalled and filled
with more obstacles for students of color to succeed than their White peers,
the Supreme Court should find merit with arguments that present data evidencing how inequities prohibit all students from accessing higher education
on the same level. That White applicants have been historically privileged
with access to higher education is a key consideration missing within the Supreme Court’s current race-conscious admissions jurisprudence.29
Neil Gotanda asserts the idea of a “formal race” analysis used by the
Supreme Court in which it views individuals “as neutral, apolitical descriptions, reflecting merely ‘skin color’ or country of ancestral origin.”30 Formalrace is unrelated to ability, disadvantage, or moral culpability.”31 Therefore,
in reverse discrimination lawsuits involving White plaintiffs, courts dismiss
the “connections between the race of the individual and the real social conditions underlying a litigation or other constitutional dispute.”32 Without the
acknowledgement of historical or social factors, the interests of Whites are
made supreme in intentionally not recognizing race.33 Ultimately, colorblind
legal rhetoric “allows the Supreme Court to be blind to the law’s role in sustaining white supremacy and to preserve the myth of the law’s innocence.”34
As a legal strategy, colorblindness is appealing to the judiciary, but for
litigants suing for justice, “it has now become an impediment in the struggle
to end racial inequality.”35 Using a formal race approach to decisions gives
justices a non-complicated task.36 If the veiled realities of racism are not
acknowledged, the judiciary’s decision making process can be performed in
a manner in which abstraction prevails and intellectually sound rulings are
28. Patricia Gándara, Addressing Educational Inequities for Latino Students: The Politics of
“Forgetting,” 4 J. HISPANIC HIGHER EDUC. 295 (2005); see also THE FIRST-YEAR EXPERIENCE
MONOGRAPH SERIES, TRANSFORMING THE FIRST-YEAR OF COLLEGE FOR STUDENTS OF COLOR
(Laura I. Rendón et al. eds., 2004).
29. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 676 (1938); see also Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); see also McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for
Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); see also Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
30. Gotanda, supra note 4, at 4. Western State College of Law Professor, Neil Gotanda, has
litigated, taught, and published deeply on discrimination and civil rights; he is one of the nation’s
foremost scholars on critical race theory. Full Time Faculty, WESTERN STATE COLLEGE OF LAW
https://www.wsulaw.edu/faculty-and-staff/full-time-faculty#neil-gotanda (last visited July 13,
2017).
31. Gotanda, supra note 4, at 4.
32. Id. at 7.
33. Id.
34. Carrie Crenshaw, Colorblind Rhetoric, 63 S. COMM. J. 244, 254 (1988).
35. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness. 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1062
(1991).
36. Id.
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issued based on the Supreme Court’s creation of doctrinal tests that cannot
be invalidated unless the Court acquiesces.37
Colorblindness in legal jurisprudence was first introduced by Justice
Harlan in his Plessy dissent, where he stated, “[o]ur constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”38 Considering the preceding text to this infamous statement that has been adopted by so
many, provides a complete and accurate understanding of Justice Harlan’s
viewpoint:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth,
and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it
remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the principles of
constitutional liberty. But in view of the constitution, in the eye of
the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class
of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind. .
.39
Highly critical of the Supreme Court’s decisions in both Plessy and
Brown, an Associate Professor of English and Humanities, David Holmes,
asserts there was “rhetorical maneuvering around color consciousness and
back toward a racist consciousness in vogue during those historical moments.
This is why the defenders of both decisions could claim to be following the
letter of the Fourteenth Amendment.”40 The use of legal rhetoric around
equality masks the systemic issues of “how we engage or ignore race as an
ideology so as to reproduce said material inequalities,”41 which results in the
maintenance of the status quo and in reality, continued inequality.
IV. RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS: SETTING THE LEGAL
BACKGROUND
Opponents of race-conscious admissions programs have argued that the
programs violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
because they consider race in admitting students.42 Under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, “no State shall . . . deny to any

37. Id.
38. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Holmes, supra note 8, at 36.
41. Id.
42. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct.
2411 (2013).
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person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,”43 and “similar
individuals . . . be dealt with in a similar manner by the government.”44 To
determine the constitutionality of a government act, courts must apply one of
three standards of judicial review—strict scrutiny, mid-level scrutiny, or rational basis.45
Because race is at question in these race-conscious admissions cases,
courts must employ the strict scrutiny standard when deciding whether the
admissions policy is constitutional.46 Strict scrutiny is the most stringent
standard of review used by the courts, and the most demanding of the reviews
to satisfy.47 Strict scrutiny is also required in government acts concerning
discrimination based on national origin, religion, and alienage.48 To pass
strict scrutiny, the government must first illustrate that its act to treat people
differently is justified by a compelling government interest.49 As the law
currently stands, the Supreme Court has found that the promotion of diversity
in higher education is a “compelling governmental interest.”50 Second, under
the strict scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court must find that race-conscious
admissions policies are “narrowly tailored.”51 To be constitutional, a government act employing racial classifications must satisfy both prongs.52
Cases have established the Supreme Court’s interpretation of constitutionally
aligned programs over the past several decades. Next, these cases are briefly
discussed.
A. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA V. BAKKE
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke was the first Supreme
Court case that set the foundation for race-conscious admissions.53 The University of California Davis Medical School considered race in its admissions
practices by strictly setting aside sixteen out of one hundred seats for “economically and educationally disadvantaged applicants and members of a minority group (Blacks, Chicanos, Asian Americans and American Indians).”54
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44. 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.2, 208 (3d ed. 1999).
45. See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
500-92 (17th ed. 2010).
46. Id. at 519.
47. Id. at 500.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 501.
50. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
51. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
52. Id.
53. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
54. Id. at 289.
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A White male applicant who was rejected twice by the medical school
claimed that he was denied admission because of his race in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.55 Allan Bakke argued the medical school accepted
less qualified racial minority applicants because the minority students who
filled these sixteen spots had lower GPAs and test scores than otherwise rejected White students.56 While the Supreme Court found the medical
school’s race-conscious policy unconstitutional because reserving a specific
number of seats to be filled only by minorities was not narrowly tailored,57
the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s ruling that race could never be
considered a factor in admissions programs.58 In this opinion, Justice Powell
noted that diversity is critical to train future leaders.59 It is a compelling government interest to have a broader definition of diversity where race and ethnicity are important factors along with other qualifications and characteristics.60 Additionally, an admissions program may consider diversity
holistically while examining an admissions application.61 After Bakke, some
universities were still uncertain how race could be used in admissions.62
B. GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER & GRATZ V. BOLLINGER
After a couple of decades and many lower court decisions, in 2013, the
Supreme Court provided clarity about the appropriate use of race in Grutter
v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger.63 The six-to-three Gratz decision struck
down the undergraduate admissions program at the University of Michigan,
because it held the automatic designation of twenty points to every applicant
from an underrepresented minority group was not narrowly tailored nor a

55. Id. at 278.
56. See id.
57. Suzanne E. Eckes, Race-Conscious Admissions Programs: Where Do Universities Go from
Gratz and Grutter?, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 21, 23 (2004); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277.
58. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313-20.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 313-20.
61. Id. at 318.
62. See generally Podberesky v. Kirwan 38 F.3d 147, 158 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that the
University of Maryland’s scholarship program for African-American students was not narrowly
tailored); see also Hopwood v. Tex., 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding the University’s raceconscious admissions policy unconstitutional); see also Smith v. U. of Wash. L. Sch., 233 F.3d
1188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding the University’s race-conscious admissions policy); see also
Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1237(11th Cir. 2001) (finding the University’s race-conscious admissions policy unconstitutional).
63. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003).
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holistic approach.64 Quota systems insulate certain applicants from competition with other applicants based on race or ethnicity.65 However, in Grutter,
the law school’s admissions program satisfied Bakke, because it considered
each applicant as an individual, looking at how each may contribute to the
diversity of the school and using race and ethnicity only as a “plus” in addition to other characteristics.66 In a five-to-four decision, the Grutter Court
adopted Justice Powell’s ruling in Bakke, finding that race could be considered in admissions practices, so long as it was one of the many factors considered.67 The Supreme Court upheld the reasoning that student body diversity is a compelling state interest.68
The Grutter Court also required admissions programs to consider other
criteria beyond grades and test scores, such as the applicant’s personal statement, the quality of the undergraduate institution, letters of recommendation,
and whether the applicant chose challenging undergraduate courses, among
other criteria set by the institution.69 This holistic review could also examine
one’s study abroad experiences, language proficiencies, and record of community service. The Supreme Court found narrow tailoring does not require
that “exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative” be attempted
before a race-conscious policy is implemented, but it does require that universities consider race-neutral plans in good faith.70 Up until now, this approach to admissions has survived the strict scrutiny test while under review
of the Supreme Court.71 However, recent cases, such as the grant of certiorari
of Fisher II72 and the filing of cases against Harvard University and the University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill by the Students for Fair Admissions,
Inc.,73 suggest that universities may no longer be able to admit students with
this approach. This potential change will be discussed later in the Article.
While the Grutter Court mentioned “the deviation from the norm of equal
treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter[,]”74 Justice

64. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 250-60.
65. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
66. Id. at 328.
67. Id. at 312.
68. Id. at 320-25.
69. Id. at 312.
70. Id.
71. See Eckes, supra note 57, at 28.
72. Fisher v. Univ. Tex. at Austin, No. 09-50822 (5th Cir. July 15, 2014), available at:
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/09/09-50822-CV2.pdf.
73. Students for Fair Admissions v. The President and Fellows of Harvard Coll., et al., No.
1:14-cv-14176-DJC, 2014 WL 6241935, (D.Mass. Nov. 17, 2014); see also Students for Fair Admissions v. U. of N.C., et al., No. 1:14-cv-00954, 2014 WL 6386755 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 17, 2014).
74. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344-47.
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O’Connor suggested “the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary”75 in twenty-five years from its ruling in 2003.76 Given that only over
one decade later since the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of
race-conscious higher education admission programs and evidence of institutional racism is still embedded in American society,77 it is premature for
today’s Supreme Court Justices to reverse its previously held precedence.
C. FISHER V. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN (“FISHER I”)
In 2008, Abigail Fisher claimed racial discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause because she was denied admission to UTA.78 Based
on current legal precedent, UTA considered race as a factor among many
others, and it currently admits students through a two-step process based on
state and federal law.79
First, under the state’s Top Ten Percent Plan, high school students who
graduate in the top ten percent of their class are eligible for automatic admission to any public college or university in Texas.80 The Top Ten Percent Plan
was passed in response to the decline in minority student enrollment after the
decision in Hopwood v. Texas.81 The law also suggested that public universities consider a variety of other factors in admissions decisions for students
not eligible under the law, which included socioeconomic status, bilingual
proficiency, and first-generation college student.82 Not surprisingly, race
was not one of these factors.83 Although students are automatically eligible,
it does not necessarily mean that they are automatically admitted to their institution of choice.84
Second, based on the Grutter v. Bollinger decision, applicants that are
not eligible under the state’s Top Ten Percent Plan could be considered using
the Grutter standard, which considered race as one of many “plus factors”
that each candidate contributes to the learning environment.85 UTA asked
students to identify their race among five predefined racial categories, and
race was not assigned a numerical value, but was considered a meaningful

75. Id.
76. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 344-347.
77. David H. K. Nguyen, et al, Strict Scrutiny & Fisher: The Court’s Decision & Its Implications, 299 EDUC. L. REP. 355, 371-372 (2014).
78. Fisher v. U. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
79. Id.
80. See generally, Texas Top Ten Percent Law, TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2009).
81. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932.
82. See generally TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.805 (West 2009).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2413.
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factor.86 The various plus factors were then plotted on a grid and students
above a specific baseline were offered admission, while others were not offered such admission.87 Fisher claimed that she was discriminated against
because UTA used the Grutter-based race-conscious admissions process after admitting students through the Texas-legislated Top Ten Percent Plan.88
The District Court found UTA’s policy constitutional.89 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit ruled the policy was not akin to an illegal quota or racial balancing
and affirmed the District Court’s finding.90 The Fifth Circuit interpreted
Grutter to give substantial deference to UTA to define the benefits of diversity that provide the compelling government interest and to determine
whether its admission plan is narrowly tailored to achieve this goal.91
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held seven-to-one that the
Fifth Circuit failed to properly apply strict scrutiny.92 The Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit.93 While the Fisher
I Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of Grutter-based admissions programs that considered “racial minority status as a positive or favorable factor
in a university’s admissions process, with the goal of achieving the educational benefits of a more diverse student body,”94 it stressed, as outlined in
Gratz and Grutter, that these admissions processes must undergo the strictest
standard of judicial review.95 Justice Kennedy, in Fisher I, agreed with the
Fifth Circuit that UTA has the expertise and experience to determine the
scope of diversity and how it would benefit its campus, students, faculty, and
staff.96 However, Justice Kennedy did not agree on the level of deference
that the lower court gave to UTA regarding how it implemented this admissions plan.97 Justice Kennedy wrote, “there must still be a further judicial
determination that the admissions process meets strict scrutiny in its implementation.”98 The University must prove that its chosen means to attain diversity are narrowly tailored.”99 Justice Kennedy stressed on this prong of

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Fisher v. U. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011).
See id. at 232.
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2411.
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strict scrutiny that the University is to receive no deference.100 Complying
with this rationale would have required the lower court to test whether there
was no other alternative to achieve the benefits of diversity than this admissions plan.
However, the Fifth Circuit noted that it was “ill-equipped” to make this
determination and that it only needed to ensure UTA made a good faith effort
to consider alternatives.101 Justice Kennedy disagreed stating that the Fifth
Circuit deferred the narrow tailoring analysis to UTA’s good faith without
considering evidence sufficiently.102 While the Supreme Court, in Fisher I,
did not overrule the use of race-conscious admissions policies upheld in the
previous Grutter decision, dissenting Justices Scalia and Thomas supported
the notion for doing so.103 In sharp contrast, Justice Ginsburg, argued that
under strict scrutiny UTA’s policy does not require further judicial review,
and its use of race as a factor continues to serve an important purpose in
helping UTA to increase the educational benefits of diversity.104 Additionally, she argued that colorblind, race-neutral policies, such as Texas’ Top Ten
Percent Plan, which are supposed to be less discriminatory alternatives to
race-conscious plans are actually by no means race-neutral.105
On remand, the Fifth Circuit heard the case again.106 The Fifth Circuit
gave the attorneys a list of questions to consider at this next level.107 The list
of questions addressed everything from whether the case is now moot because Fisher graduated from another institution, Louisiana State University,
to whether the appeals court or district court should hear the next round.108
The Fifth Circuit had the option of ruling on the constitutionality of the plan
or sending the case down to the district court to determine additional facts
involving the plan. Attorneys for Fisher urged the Fifth Circuit to rule on the
case, while the University requested the case be sent back to the district court
in order to gather additional facts about the admissions policy.109 The Fifth
Circuit found merit with Fisher’s position by stating “there are no new issues
of fact that need to be resolved, nor is there any identified need for additional

100. See id.
101. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 231.
102. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
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106. Lyle Denniston, Next Round in Fisher Case, SCOTUS BLOG (Sept. 12, 2013, 3:31 PM),
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107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Lyle Denniston, Next Round in Fisher Case, SCOTUS BLOG (Sept. 12, 2013, 3:31 PM),
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discovery; that the record is sufficiently developed . . . remand would likely
result in duplication of effort.”110
Some scholars suggest the Supreme Court wanted the Fifth Circuit to
make it more challenging for colleges and universities to implement raceconscious admissions plans.111 However, the Fifth Circuit in a two-to-one
decision found merit again with UTA’s plan being constitutionally sound in
both prongs of the strict scrutiny analysis by being narrowly tailored to
achieve diversity.112 The Fifth Circuit began its discussion by restating the
Supreme Court’s precedent in Grutter that “all racial classifications imposed
by government ‘must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’”113 The court acknowledged that Justice Kennedy’s Fisher dissent
“faulted the district court’s and this Court’s review of UT Austin’s means to
achieve the permissible goal of diversity – whether UT Austin’s efforts were
narrowly tailored to achieve the end of a diverse student body.”114
Before proceeding with its analysis, the Fifth Circuit declared “our
charge is to give exacting scrutiny to these efforts.”115 After a detailed discussion of the Top Ten Percent Plan and the University’s additional admissions office diversity efforts, the court reiterated the Grutter precedent, which
mandates that “narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceiveable race-neutral alternative” but rather “serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the
university seeks.”116 The court asserted “put simply, this record shows that
UT Austin implemented every race-neutral effort that its detractors now insist must be exhausted prior to adopting a race-conscious admissions program-in addition to an automatic admissions plan not required under Grutter
that admits over 80% of the student body with no facial use of race at all.”117
The Fifth Circuit then brought attention to the circumstances under
which the plan exists by stating that “the sad truth is that the Top Ten Percent
Plan gains diversity from a fundamental weakness in the Texas secondary
education system.”118 The court shared data in a footnote to support its assertion that “the de facto segregation of schools in Texas enables the Top Ten
Percent Plan to increase minorities in the mix, while ignoring contributions
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to diversity beyond race.”119 The court viewed the Top Ten Percent Plan as
“nearly indistinguishable from the University of Michigan’s Law School’s
program in Grutter” and “was a necessary and enabling component of the
Top Ten Percent Plan by allowing UT Austin to reach a pool of minority and
non-minority students with records of personal achievement, higher average
test scores or other unique skills.”120 Persuaded by UTA’s admission plan
and its implementation, the Fifth Circuit stated “to deny UT Austin its limited
use of race in its search for holistic diversity would hobble the richness of the
educational experience in contradiction of the plain teachings of Bakke and
Grutter.”121 In its final opinion sentence, the Fifth Circuit invoked two of the
four seminal race-conscious cases, “to reject the UT Austin plan is to confound developing principles of neutral affirmative action, looking away from
Bakke and Grutter, leaving them in uniform but without command—due only
a courtesy salute in passing.”122
In his twenty-six-page dissent, Judge Emilio M. Garza argued UTA did
not define “critical mass” and, therefore, “whether the University’s use of
racial classifications in its admissions process is narrowly tailored to its stated
goal . . . remains unknown.”123 Judge Garza accused the majority of “defer[ing] impermissibly to the University’s claims,” and he asserted “this deference is squarely at odds with the central lesson of Fisher.”124 Ultimately,
he concluded that UTA had not satisfied the narrowly tailored prong and,
therefore, would have reversed the court’s previous decision and ruled in favor of Fisher.125 The en banc request made by Fisher’s legal team was denied, and now the Supreme Court will decide if the strict scrutiny two-prong
test was properly applied on remand by the Fifth Circuit in Fisher I.126
The Fifth Circuit entered its ruling on July 15, 2014, in favor of UTA,
and Fisher filed a petition for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.127
On December 9, 2015, the Supreme Court heard another challenge against
UTA.128
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D. FISHER V. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN (“FISHER II”)
During oral arguments, the Justices, excluding Justice Clarence Thomas,
posed several questions to attorneys on both sides.129 Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor interrupted Fisher’s attorney, Bert Rein, early into his argument.130 Justice Ginsburg inquired whether there would be a case if the Top
Ten Percent Plan was eliminated and only the Grutter-like plan remained.131
Justice Sotomayor joined the questioning, appearing not to be satisfied with
Rein’s response, and asked how UTA had improperly used race in conflict
with the Bakke standard.132 Justice Scalia inquired about critical mass studies
and how UTA would know when it had reached a sufficient number of students of color.133 Rein stated UTA utilized a good faith approach that passed
muster with a majority in the Fifth Circuit but not with the Supreme Court.134
Justice Kennedy, who has been labeled a swing voter in civil rights related cases, asked Fisher’s attorney to give an example of a concrete criteria
that UTA would use to achieve diversity.135 He and Justice Alito seemed
concerned that additional facts were needed, and without them, Justice Kennedy said “we’re just arguing the same case.”136 Rein did not give a response
that was sufficient to the question in that he argued the solicitor general would
attempt to transform “abstract goals into concrete objectives.”137 It appeared
questions about the process to achieve classroom diversity were not addressed to some Justices’ satisfaction.138 The Supreme Court stated in its
Fisher opinion that unbridled deference would not be given to UTA’s decision making procedures.139 Justice Breyer reiterated this position during an
exchange with UTA’s attorney, Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., in
which Justice Breyer stated, “this Court will give some, but not complete,
deference to what the University decides.”140 Chief Justice Roberts and Solicitor General Verrilli, who argued in support of UTA’s program, had an
exchange in which Chief Justice Roberts specifically asked “how does the
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University know when it has achieved its objective?”141 The solicitor general
did not directly answer the question; instead, he focused on how the proposed
approach by Fisher’s counsel of setting a demographic goal was not the solution.142 Chief Justice Roberts along with Justices Scalia, Alito, and Kennedy, posed questions that reflected a skepticism about whether UTA had
met its burden of persuasion by providing enough evidence to support its additional use of race in the admissions process.143 Chief Justice Roberts asked
UTA’s attorney if the twenty-five-year end to affirmative action, suggested
by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in Grutter, would be done in twelve
years.144 Gregory G. Garre responded that systematic problems in K-12 education, specifically test score disparities along racial lines, made a definitive
answer difficult.145 Based on the Justices’ questions, it seemed as though a
majority might have remanded the case back to the district court for additional evidence gathering. Alternatively, the majority might find the use of
race unconstitutional because UTA did not meet both prongs of the strict
scrutiny standard as to why race is an additional factor when considering the
diversity of the student body.146 However, no remand occurred and on June
23, 2016, by a four-to-three decision, the Supreme Court upheld UTA’s raceconscious admissions plan.147 Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion
that was supported by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor.148 Justices
Alito, Roberts, and Thomas dissented.149 The Supreme Court reasoned that
Fisher had not met her burden of proof to show that UTA’s plan violated the
Equal Protection Clause and UTA had provided a detailed account of its current application review process and the nonracial measures taken that did not
meet its diversity goals.150
V. COLORBLIND DISCOURSE APPLIED
In Bakke, Justice Powell gave a different interpretation of the colorblind
argument that “prohibits the use of race as the sole factor in government decisions absent a compelling justification.”151 Ironically, each Justice asserted
that his colorblind position was based on an interpretation of the Fourteenth
141.
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Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.152 A critical distinction in both Justices’ interpretations is that “Harlan believed that the Fourteenth Amendment
has special relevance for Blacks, while Powell believed that Blacks and
Whites must receive the same treatment.”153 Both interpretations lead to different outcomes and not necessarily either will result in justice for people of
color regarding admission to race-conscious higher education institutions.
Justice Powell’s version of colorblindness disconnects history and reality
from the Court’s analysis. It allows “white privilege”154 to be unnamed and
avoids the questioning of white supremacy and social dominance. Colorblind
rhetoric distracts our society from dealing with the complex nature of “race”
and “racism.” It has stalled the discussions and actions of colleges and universities as they have adopted this detrimental Utopian viewpoint.
Whiteness being normal aligns with the rhetoric of innocence, which is
a concept discussed by legal scholar, Thomas Ross, as a legal tool used by
White rhetoricians, lawyers, and judges.155 He asserts that the avoidance of
Whites benefitting people of color’s oppression is a key component in the
rhetoric of innocence, because it “obscures this question: What white person
is ‘innocent’ if innocence is defined as the absence of advantage at the expense of others?”156 Bakke is an example in which “Justice Lewis Powell
introduced the rhetoric of innocence to the Court’s affirmative action discourse,” appearing throughout the opinion and the oral argument.157 In the
Bakke opinion, Justice Powell stated that “the patent unfairness of ‘innocent
persons . . . asked to endure [deprivation as] the price of membership in the
dominant majority . . . forcing innocent persons . . . to bear the burdens of
redressing grievances not of their making.’”158
Racial arrogance fuels conservatives to seek out ideal litigants for reverse discrimination lawsuits. In Bakke, neither the university, Justices, nor
Bakke “contested the legitimacy of medical school admissions standards that

152. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326-327.
153. B. K. Fair, Foreword:Rethinking the Colorblindness Model. 13 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 2
(1993).
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than people of color do; in other words, purely on the basis of our skin color doors are open
to us that are not open to other people. Francis E. Kendall, Understanding White Privilege,
(2002),http://www.cpt.org/files/Undoing%20Racism%20-%20Understanding%20White%20Privilege%20-%20Kendall.pdf.
155. See generally THOMAS ROSS, JUST STORIES: HOW THE LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND
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reserved five seats in each class for children of wealthy donors to the university or that penalized Bakke for being older than most of the other applicants.”159 The Center for Individual Rights (“CRI”), a public interest group
founded by Ward Connerly, a mixed race man of color, born and raised during segregation who advocates for the eradication of affirmative action
measures, including race-conscious admissions in higher education, intentionally and strategically seeks out locations and people to challenge equity
focused practices. Connerly, being a person of color, gives credence to racial
arrogance and serves as a poster child for post-racial society rhetoric. Barbara Grutter, Jennifer Gratz, and Abigail Fisher, all white women with innocent and hardworking narratives, set the stage for arguing violation of their
Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the context of
higher education, Whites view themselves as having a right to obtain a degree, and therefore, should be entitled to a “seat” in undergraduate, graduate,
and professional schools.160 This sense of entitlement has been reinforced in
higher education since its inception, and it has resulted in lawsuits filed
against policies supporting the inclusion of people of color and not including
legacies, athletes, or other Whites with lower scores.161 People of color are
easy targets because of their marginalized “place” in society that has been
politically, socially, and legally framed as unworthy of being admitted to a
university over a White person.162
In higher education and society, master narratives using “diversity” exist
within the race-conscious admissions debate.163 Two ideologies of the construct “diversity” have become institutionalized in the public’s rhetoric about
equality efforts.164 One is that “diversity ideology represents white elites’
taming of what began as a radical fight for African-American equality” and
the other is “the ideology of ‘diversity’ was a neoliberal response to the reactionary blowback against affirmative action.”165 Both ideologies of diversity are flawed because neither has substantially moved society in a direction
of inclusion and equality.

159. George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: Racialized Social Democracy,
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Derrick Bell voiced four key concerns with diversity and described it as
a “distraction” to the achievement of racial justice.166 To support the four
reasons, Bell gave specific examples for each one based on the Gratz and
Grutter cases.167 First, “diversity enables courts and policymakers to avoid
addressing directly the barriers of race and class that adversely affect so many
applicants.”168 Bell argued that his interest convergence thesis in which people of color only receive benefits when Whites are not disenfranchised by the
benefits, is manifested through the Justices’ and lawmakers’ lack of recognition for a history of discrimination that continues to impact people of color’s
advancement, specifically in higher education.169 Bell stated the “Michigan
lawyers and their civil rights allies shifted the focus from remediation for past
discrimination to the value of diversity to the schools and to society.”170
Second, “diversity invites further litigation by offering a distinction
without a real difference between those uses of race approved in college admissions programs, and those in other far more important affirmative action
policies that the Court has rejected.”171 Litigation possibilities are increased
by the Supreme Court’s fragmented opinions in both Gratz and Grutter. Bell
argued “the narrowness of this diversity ‘victory’ in the law school case and
its vulnerability in future litigation can be gauged by the Grutter dissents.”172
Heavy criticism from the disagreeing Justices of diversity meeting the strict
scrutiny standard and the lack of definition for “critical mass” are evidence
that the use of race in higher education admissions is not settled.173 Further
proof of this turmoil is the Supreme Court’s acceptance of hearing Fisher a
second time. This decision signals to civil rights allies that the Supreme
Court is not in agreement with the Fifth Circuit’s application of the strict
scrutiny standard to use race as a factor in conjunction with Texas’s Top Ten
Percent Plan. There should be great concern that the decision will be made

166. Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622 (2003). Derrick Bell, the first Black professor to be tenured at Harvard University Law School, is often
credited as a founder of Critical Race Theory, a school of thought and scholarship that critically engages questions of race and racism in the law, investigating how even those legal
institutions purporting to remedy racism can more profoundly entrench it. Bell’s work provides the reader with a perspective that challenges the status quo rationale for inequity in
the race-conscious admissions discourse. Derek Bell Official Site, http://professorderrickbell.com/about/ (last visited July 13, 2017).
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through a colorblind constitutional analysis, which would eradicate the use
of race in any form as an admissions consideration factor.
Third, “diversity serves to give undeserved legitimacy to the heavy reliance on grades and test scores that privilege well-to-do, mainly white applicants.”174 Bell discussed meritocracy by using Justice Thomas’s opinion in
Grutter v. Bollinger175 that concurs in part and dissents in part.176 Justice
Thomas explained that he is anti-affirmative action because of “his conviction that all such remedies are unconstitutional” and his personal belief that
“blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without the meddling
of university administrators.”177 Justice Thomas pointed out that alumni’s
children being specially admitted is evidence of the lack of merit as a criterion, yet this group does not draw needed attention and has not been included
in litigation.178 Bell provided data that was collected to show how financial
disparities disproportionately impact the ability of students of color to afford
resources that can enhance their standardized test scores.179 “[T]he standardized tests are retained for the convenience of the schools even though they
privilege applicants from well-to-do families, alumni children, and those
born into celebrity.”180 Limited resources to afford tutors for college preparation tests or access to the “best performing” schools is disproportionately
weighted against students of color in comparison to the White peers.181
Fourth, Bell points out that “[t]he tremendous attention directed at diversity programs diverts concern and resources from the serious barriers of poverty that exclude far more students entering college than are likely to gain
admission under an affirmative action program.”182 To support this view, he
gave examples about the economic hardships of people of color that have an
impact on all areas of their lives, including quality education in the K-12 setting.183 He concluded with a harsh criticism of diversity as not being an effective practice for the admission of students of color, but rather, “it is a
shield behind which college administrators can retain policies of admission
that are woefully poor measures of quality, but convenient vehicles for admitting the children of wealth and privilege.”184
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Building on Bell’s assertion that diversity is a distraction, legal scholar,
Kenneth Nunn, argued that “diversity fails as a social justice tool” and “provides no mechanism for addressing ongoing racial inequities.”185 Because
the Supreme Court ruled quotas, set-asides, and “racial balancing” methods
as unconstitutional, the process of colleges and universities intentionally assessing their campuses for students, faculty, and administrators of color is a
risky decision and any numerical measures implemented to address “low”
numbers could result in lawsuits.186
With the change of the Supreme Court’s majority viewpoint of race-conscious admissions programs between Bakke and Fisher, it has established a
challenging set of “doctrinal barriers that must be overcome before a majoritarian affirmative action plan can be upheld.”187 Having determined that
strict scrutiny is the analysis tool to determine if a governmental program
meets a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve the stated
interest in race-conscious higher education cases, the benefits of diversity and
the Supreme Court’s analysis has evolved into a position that “equate[s] benign discrimination with invidious discrimination, as if the harms that affirmative action imposes on Whites are equivalent to the harms that Whites have
imposed on racial minorities.”188 Additionally, at one time, the Supreme
Court viewed racial affirmative action solutions as if there was inadequacy
with proposed race-neutral measures.189 Based on the analysis of seven of
the nine Justices and the lack of differences between Gratz and Grutter, the
concern for a definitive standard is warranted. Ironically, Justice Kennedy
stated that strict scrutiny “must not be strict in theory but fatal in fact,”190
which seems to be the same sentiment of two members of the conservative
majority bloc. In Grutter, Justices Scalia and Thomas stated that they did not
find merit with “the educational benefits flowing from student body diversity” meeting the compelling state interest analysis.191 At no time in history
has the number of people of color been substantial enough to disrupt the homogenous environments of predominantly White institutions of higher education. These are still very “White spaces” and many are not welcoming to
people of color, be it students, staff, faculty, or administrators.
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VI. TODAY’S CONTESTS AGAINST RACE-CONSCIOUS
ADMISSIONS
The current status of race-conscious admissions is uncertain. With the
movement to ban affirmative action, the new legal challenges against Harvard University and the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, and an
upcoming anticipated conservative appointment to the Supreme Court, there
is a full-fledged effort to eliminate race as one of the many factors in admissions decisions and the ability of institutions of higher education to shape the
diverse make-up of their student body. The Supreme Court may either eliminate the use of race-conscious admissions, make it more challenging for institutions to utilize, or heighten the strict scrutiny standard impacting affirmative action programs broadly. The following section provides an analysis
of current litigation.
A. STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. V. HARVARD & STUDENTS
FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS V. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINACHAPEL HILL
On Monday, November 17, 2014, two separate lawsuits were filed
against Harvard University and the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
by a “newly-formed, nonprofit, membership organization whose members
include highly qualified students recently denied admissions to both schools,
highly qualified students who plan to apply to both schools, and their parents.”192 The 120-page complaint against Harvard accused the University of
“employing racially and ethnically discriminatory policies and procedures in
administering the undergraduate admissions program at Harvard College in
violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”193 The plaintiffs also
claimed that Harvard’s current program has resulted in a limited number of
qualified Asian-Americans admitted yearly to the University.194 Project on
Fair Representation’s (“POFR”) executive director, Edward Blum, helped to
fund this lawsuit as well as Fisher v. University of Texas.195 Ironically, the

192. Theodore R. Delwiche, Suit Alleges Race-Based Discrimination in Harvard Admissions
Practices, THE HARV. CRIMSON (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/11/18/law-suit-admissions-alleged-discrimination/.
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Coll., et al., No.1:14-cv-14176-DJC (D.Mass. Nov. 17, 2003), 2014 WL 6241935.
194. Id. at 4.
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suit comes six months after POFR launched a website soliciting "students
who claim they were not admitted to Harvard because of their race to participate in a potential lawsuit."196 Harvard's general counsel released a statement that referenced Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, touting the University's admissions plan as being ‘legally sound’ and alleged the University has
continued the same practice consistently over the years.197
Within the group of plaintiffs, there is at least one Asian-American who
is a first-generation college student, graduated top of his high school class,
scored a 36 on the ACT, and was active in multiple extracurricular activities,
that was denied admission to Harvard.198 This student will seek a transfer to
Harvard if it no longer uses race or ethnicity in its admissions “preference.”199
In the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill’s complaint, the plaintiffs
alleged the same violation of Title VI and that the University cannot fulfill
the strict scrutiny standard upon constitutional review since in the University’s amicus brief submitted in Fisher I the University stated it could “. . .
maintain, and actually increase, racial diversity through race-neutral means
if it ends its race-based affirmative action policies.”200 To date, no rulings
have been made on either case to impact the future of affirmative action.201
However, institutions of higher education and other stakeholders should continue to monitor these cases.
VII. IMPLICATIONS AND BEST-PRACTICES FOR RECRUITING
AND RETAINING DIVERSITY
The discourse in the Fisher II oral argument was limited to the attention
being brought to structural racism within the Texas K-12 school system.202
UTA attorney Garre argued that without the use of race as an additional factor, the Top Ten Percent Plan did not yield a sufficient number of Blacks or
Hispanics for classroom diversity.203 Colorblindness was evident in Chief
Justice Roberts’ assertion that the Supreme Court has given the University
“the extraordinary power to consider race in making important decisions . . .
and so it was important in Grutter to say, look, this can’t go on forever, 25
196. See Delwiche, supra note 192.
197. Id.
198. See Complaint, supra note 193, at 8.
199. Id. at 9.
200. Project on Fair Representation Announces Lawsuits Challenging Admissions Policies at
Harvard University & University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill., STUDENTS FOR FAIR
ADMISSIONS, https://studentsforfairadmissions.org (last visited Apr. 26, 2017).
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years. And when do you think your program will be done?”204 Here Chief
Justice Roberts appears to have dismissed the University’s assertion that race
still matters, instead focusing on a deadline for ending measures that have
been implemented to address centuries of subjugation, which minimizes the
reality of racism not only in our society, but also in higher education practices.
Institutions of higher education should take note of the Supreme Court’s
Fisher II ruling in which review of admissions policies and criteria are expected to happen periodically.205 If there is a holistic review utilized, the
factors considered should be transparent to potential students via websites,
printed materials, and during on-campus recruiting events.206 Specifically,
individual applicant review should consist of evaluating contributions in the
form of various backgrounds and characteristics that align with an institution’s goals for inclusion.207 Additionally in 2011, the Department of Justice,
in conjunction with the Department of Education, released a report, Guidance
on the Voluntary use of Race to Achieve Diversity in Postsecondary Education, summarizing the Supreme Court’s Grutter/Gratz decisions and providing examples for admissions practices that would be legal.208 One of the
recommendations included a top percentile program similar to the one challenged in Fisher I, as well as using non-race factors such as socioeconomic
and/or first generation status to potentially draw students from different racial
and ethnic backgrounds.209 Programs like the Top Ten Percent Plan are constitutional based on the Fisher II decision. However, institutions of higher
education that target students using race-neutral factors should maintain data
on the ways in which their use of race continues to align with the Supreme
Court’s analysis of the Texas plan, otherwise the potential for lawsuits alleging reverse discrimination may be imminent.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
With the prevalence of a “post-racial society” ideology being dominant
in our culture and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, scholars and other
stakeholders inside and outside the academy should work towards “demonstrat[ing] the harmful effects of racially isolated learning environments for
minorities and society at-large.”210 Grassroots organizations that can politically influence local, state, and national lawmakers to defeat and repeal legislation designed to re-segregate education at all levels is critical in light of
the recent movement of using the ballot initiatives to further a colorblind
agenda.
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